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Abstract: This paper discusses concepts of self-organized complexity and the theory of 
Coherent Infomax in the light of Jaynes’s probability theory. Coherent Infomax, shows, in 
principle, how adaptively self-organized complexity can be preserved and improved by 
using probabilistic inference that is context-sensitive. It argues that neural systems do this 
by combining local reliability with flexible, holistic, context-sensitivity. Jaynes argued that 
the logic of probabilistic inference shows it to be based upon Bayesian and Maximum 
Entropy methods or special cases of them. He presented his probability theory as the logic 
of science; here it is considered as the logic of life. It is concluded that the theory of 
Coherent  Infomax  specifies  a  general  objective  for  probabilistic  inference,  and  that 
contextual interactions in neural systems perform functions required of the scientist within 
Jaynes’s theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Many  forms  of  organized  complexity  have  arisen  in  nature’s  long  journey  from  uniformity  to 
maximal entropy. On earth, biological systems have created diverse forms of adaptively self-organized 
complexity despite the ever present forces of noise and disorder. This self-organization occurs in open, 
holistic, far-from-equilibrium, “non-linear” systems with feedback, which makes them highly diverse 
and  hard  to  predict.  They  depend  on  information  about  their  world  and  themselves,  and  this 
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information is used for inference-inferences about distal things from proximal signals, and inferences 
about the likely consequences of possible activities. Though usually implicit, probabilistic inference is 
central to such systems because adaptation depends upon information about the conditions to which the 
systems are adapted. Useful inference is possible because the laws of physics are sufficiently reliable, but 
the endless variety of individual circumstances and the prevalence of deterministic chaos make many 
things unpredictable. So, to thrive, biological systems must combine local reliability with holistic flexibility. 
These arguments suggest several issues on which we need to make progress. What is self-organized 
complexity? What are the capabilities and constraints of the various forms of inductive inference, e.g., 
classical versus Bayesian [1], conscious versus unconscious [2]? How is local reliability combined with 
holistic flexibility? What is context, and how can it be used? How can the information theory measures 
that have been applied to these issues be tested, and what do they contribute to our understanding? 
Better formalisation of these issues is clearly needed, so I will first give a brief outline of some 
conceptions of self-organized complexity, and then of the theory of Coherent Infomax which uses 
information theory measures to formalize these issues [3–6]. This theory was initially developed as a 
theory  of  mammalian  neocortex,  but  here  the  possibility  of  a  broader  relevance  is  considered.  A 
summary of Jaynes’s theory of probability and inference will then be given, followed by discussion 
relating it to self-organized complexity and then to Coherent Infomax. Finally, objectives of probabilistic 
inference in self-organized systems will be briefly discussed. 
2. Organized Complexity 
An obvious tension underlies the notion of organized complexity. Complexity can most simply be 
thought  of  as  the  amount  of  information  in  a  system.  That  kind  of  complexity  is  increased  by 
increasing the number of elements in a system and by increasing their independence. In contrast to 
that, organisation implies decreasing their independence. Shannon’s information entropy quantifies the 
former as it increases with independence. What is referred to here as organized complexity is often 
referred to simply as “complexity”, but I prefer to emphasize the tension by using terminology that 
makes it explicit. Many ways of quantifying the broad notion of organized complexity have been 
suggested. They typically combine order (organization/coherence) with disorder (entropy/information), 
and they often do so using measures of mutual information [7]. These measures are designed to ascribe 
high  complexity  to  systems  of  many  elements  that  interact  in  such  a  way  as  to  achieve  effective 
integration but without imposing such uniformity that their joint entropy is low. 
Self-organisation is emphasized here for two basic reasons. First, it relates to a major dilemma 
underlying Jaynes’s account of inference, i.e., does it or does it not imply someone, such as a scientist, 
who draws the inferences? Second, Jaynes’s views will be related to a theory of the inference that is 
implicit in biological systems, which I assume to be self-organized. 
Self-organisation is also common in inanimate physical systems. Bénard convection is a well-known 
example, and has been used to extract general principles of self-organisation that apply even to highly 
evolved biological systems such as the mammalian neocortex [8]. 
I assume that life is adaptively self-organized complexity. This adaptation, which is achieved by 
both genetic selection and ontogenetic plasticity, implies the selection and improvement of constructive 
processes that require a high capacity for information transmission. The window of possibility for life Information 2012, 3  3 
 
 
in all conceivable universes seems to be extremely small. Furthermore, if it depends on liquid water, as 
seems likely, it may also be small in our own actual universe. In addition to being dependent on 
information, life creates an information explosion [9] because living things are highly diverse, even 
down to the molecular  level, while also being  well coordinated both  within and across individual 
organisms. Macroscopic thermodynamic properties can be accurately estimated by averaging over vast 
numbers of elements that are assumed to be identical and with independent dynamics. Within living 
things  even  a  single  molecule  can  have  significant  effects  on  its  macroscopic  properties,  and  the 
activities of their elements are not independent, but highly interdependent. Their diversity and ability 
to surprise us is what makes them so interesting. 
3. Coherent Infomax 
The  centrality  of  probabilistic  inference  to  life  is  most  obvious  in  neural  systems.  Helmholtz 
correctly emphasized the role of unconscious inference in perception, and many demonstrations of this 
can be given [10]. Friston [11] has now shown formally how such unconscious inference may also be 
central to both reinforcement learning and motor control, which extends its relevance to much of neural 
function. Neural systems will therefore be of particular relevance to the following discussions. 
The apparent conflict between the requirements of local reliability and holistic flexibility has been 
prominent in the history of neuroscience, with one or the other being dominant at different times [12]. 
The perspective outlined here shows how these two requirements are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
as has long been assumed, but can be mutually supportive. Its central hypothesis is that there are two 
classes of neuronal interaction: driving interactions that specify the information content of the output 
signals to be transmitted by the local neuronal processor, and coordinating contextual interactions that 
modulate the gain and timing of response to the driving inputs. This theory shows how contextual 
inputs can disambiguate local signals and dynamically group them into coherent subsets. It is based 
upon much detailed psychophysical, neurobiological, and clinical evidence [13–15]. The great volume 
and diversity of that evidence suggests that formal clarification of the role of context-sensitivity in 
probabilistic inference would be a major advance. 
Our contribution to this effort has produced the theory of Coherent Infomax [3–6]. For full formal 
presentations see the original publications; only a brief outline is given here. It is closely related to 
several other influential theories [11, 16–23]. Though unification of all these theories is a task for the 
future, it seems feasible. The theory of Coherent Infomax is founded on an objective function that 
specifies the goal toward which both the short-term dynamics and the long-term plasticity of local 
neuronal processing elements are directed. Minimally, the function of local processors is to select and 
compress  that  information  in  their  primary  driving  input  that  is  relevant  to  the  current  task  and 
situation, as indicated by the contextual input. This is formalized in information theoretic terms as an 
objective function describing the signal processing work to be done. In short, the goal is to maximize 
the information transmitted about the driving inputs, giving priority to the three-way mutual information 
between  output,  driving,  and  contextual  inputs  while  minimizing  the  information  transmitted 
specifically about the context. This objective therefore uses context to control the gain of response to 
the driving inputs. To show how that objective could be met in neural systems, a biologically plausible 
activation  function  for  idealized  local  neural  processors  was  formulated  to  include  the  required  Information 2012, 3  4 
 
 
gain-control,  and  a  learning  rule  for  modifying  the  synaptic  strengths  of  the  connections  between  
these local processors was derived analytically from the objective function [3–5]. The learning rule 
derived has much in common with synaptic plasticity that has been independently discovered using 
neurophysiological techniques [13]. 
Endlessly many system architectures can be constructed from such local processing elements. A 
system architecture suggested by the anatomy of mammalian neocortex is that of at most a few tens of 
hierarchical  layers  of  processing,  with  many  specialized  but  interactive  local  processors  at  each  
stage  [13].  Feedforward  connections  between  layers  are  driving,  whereas  lateral  and  feedback 
connections provide coordinating gain-control. Though it is the dynamics of local processors that are 
specified by Coherent Infomax, its objective requires them to coordinate their activities with other local 
processors, thus producing patterns of activity that tend to maximize overall holistic coherence. This 
shows, in principle, how neural systems can use the information that is available to them to perform 
probabilistic inference in a way that combines local reliability with holistic flexibility. 
The Coherent Infomax objective can be seen as a form of statistical latent structure analysis [3–6]. 
Its  goal  is  to  discover  variables  defined  upon  each  of  many  distinct  datasets  that  have  predictive 
relations with variables defined upon other datasets. In short, its goal is to discover what predicts what. 
Therefore it concurrently discovers related variables and their relations; the variables do not need to be 
known in advance. So far, it has been mostly studied in relation to perceptual data-processing tasks, 
which has the advantage of drawing attention to the fact that inference is not at all restricted to the 
prediction of future events.  It can  equally  well  apply  across space,  or backwards in time.  In visual 
perception, predictive relationships between concurrent datasets can be used to resolve local ambiguities 
within  them.  In  auditory  perception,  inferences  from  later  inputs  can  similarly  be  used  to  resolve 
ambiguities in earlier inputs. Current astronomical data can be used to predict events in the distant past. 
The  objective  of  Coherent  Infomax  is  related  to  conceptions  of  organized  complexity,  such  as 
“effective complexity”, though it was not derived from them. The contextual interactions central to the 
theory maximize organized complexity because they coordinate activities while not becoming confounded 
with the information that those activities variously transmit. Furthermore, Coherent Infomax is highly 
compatible  with  the  small-world  network  architectures  conducive  to  high  complexity  on  these 
measures [7]. It assumes a system composed of many local processors with logically independent 
inputs, and with dynamics that allows them to communicate while preserving their distinct identities. 
This communication discovers and amplifies regularities on their inputs that are statistically related 
across processors. It can be thought of as a kind of internal mutual observation that seeks agreement. 
The  optimal  state specified by  the Coherent  Infomax objective is  computationally  tractable  only  in 
simple situations, however. Therefore, in more complex situations it is a direction of travel, not a 
terminus. There are endless possibilities for specialized sensors, effectors, and connection architectures. 
This is consistent with the great diversity that is seen in the findings of neuroscience. The hypothesis 
being examined here is that the probabilistic inference underlying all that diversity is subject to a 
single, unified, coherent logic, or computational theory. Information 2012, 3  5 
 
 
4. Jaynes’s Probability Theory 
Edwin T. Jaynes (1922–1998) was a physicist who worked on quantum electrodynamics, statistical 
mechanics, information theory, and probability theory mostly in Washington University, St. Louis, but 
also  in  Stanford,  Berkeley,  Princeton,  and  MIT  in  the  USA,  and  at  Cambridge  in  the  UK.  His 
arguments for and developments of probability as a measure of uncertainty, rather than as the relative 
frequency  of  an  outcome  in  the  “long-run”,  remain  highly  influential  in  physics,  mathematics, 
engineering, and machine-learning. Though a few neurobiologists have used Jaynes’s ideas [24,25], 
they are not yet widely known in either biology or psychology. Of his many publications, those most 
used in preparing this outline are: “Probability theory as logic” [26]; “Where do we stand on maximum 
entropy? [27]; “Information theory and statistical mechanics” [28], and the posthumous book, edited 
by  G.  Larry  Bretthorst,  “Probability  Theory:  The  Logic  of  Science”  [1].  Specific  references  to 
particular writings will be given below only where necessary. 
His  central  contribution  to  probability  theory  was  an  in-depth  study  of  its  use  to  quantify 
uncertainty. This rejected the frequentist definitions that had been dominant in statistics for many 
decades. Such a change in the definition of “probability” may seem unimportant, but it has major 
consequences, both conceptually and in real applications. Jaynes defines probability as quantifying the 
uncertainty of inferences drawn from given conditions. It is therefore often referred to as epistemic. By 
classical  frequentist  definitions  probability  quantifies  properties  of  the  observed  world,  i.e.,  it  is 
ontological. Frequentist definitions apply only to populations of observations, but epistemic probabilities 
apply also to individual cases. Furthermore, epistemic probabilities allow inferences to use all relevant 
information, whereas frequentist conceptions use only relative frequencies. Jaynes’s logic assumes that 
scientific inferences should be treated as working hypotheses that are continually improved by new 
observations. His theory shows how to update estimates of the plausibility of hypotheses by appropriately 
weighting new observations and priors according to the strength of the evidence on which they are 
based. Unjustified bias in estimating that weighting is minimized by using maximum entropy methods. 
These do not apply any law of physics, but are simply a way of making predictions without making 
arbitrary unjustified assumptions. In the simple case of dice throwing, for example, this allocates equal 
probability to all six possible outcomes, if no other information is available. Other information, of 
endless forms, can modify these probabilities, including inspection of the dice and the surface on 
which it is thrown, knowledge of the honesty of the owner, and the relative frequencies of previously 
observed outcomes. Frequentist conceptions of probability are thus treated as a special limited case of 
Jaynes’s more general interpretation of probability.  
Within Jaynes’s theory nothing is assumed to happen by chance or “at random” in reality; instead, 
he argued that randomness is a slippery, undefined, and unverifiable notion [26]. As a physicist, he 
argued against the widely held Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which quantal 
uncertainty is assumed to be a property of the world. He insisted, instead, that that could never be 
proved, so that all we can say is that no deterministic rules governing quantal events have yet been 
discovered. Discussing Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics, he notes that it is sometimes asked where 
the randomness necessary for statistical behavior comes from if the universe is at heart an orderly, 
deterministic place. Jaynes sees this as a non-problem because to him probability theory as logic easily 
explains what we see, as a consequence of physical laws even if they are deterministic. The theorems Information 2012, 3  6 
 
 
of statistical mechanics  are then interpreted as inferences predicting macroscopic behavior as best  
we can when given only knowledge of macroscopic variables that are interpreted as averages over 
microstates. More generally, he makes no use of the notion of a “random variable”, even though that is 
usually presented as fundamental to all statistics. He noted that use of this notion requires assumptions 
that are usually unnecessary and often implausible, such as ergodicity. Fortunately, resolution of this 
debate concerning ultimate determinism is not crucial here because adaptively self-organized systems 
depend  upon  what  is  in  practice  predictable,  and,  even  in  a  deterministic  world,  that  is  severely 
constrained  by  incomplete  information,  deterministic  chaos,  or  computational  feasibility.  Thus, 
probabilistic inference will usually be needed in practice because uncertainty is so common. 
It  is  often  asked  “whose”  uncertainties  are  quantified  by  using  epistemic  probabilities.  When 
discussing Shannon’s information entropy, Jaynes [1] explicitly concludes that it is the uncertainty of 
the designer of the communication system, i.e., the engineer. Self-organized systems do not have a 
designer, however, so here we need a different answer. When thinking about this problem we may be 
misled by phenomenological connotations of “uncertainty”, but they can be avoided by further study  
of  Jaynes’s  theory.  It  extends  logic  to  show  what  inferences  concerning  the  plausibility  of  given 
hypotheses can be validly drawn from given conditions. Deductive logic is the special case where 
inferred probabilities are 0 or 1. Putting it this way shows that probabilistic inference is relative to the 
given conditions, as is deduction. As that relativity is unavoidable, this shows that Jaynes’s logic is as 
“objective” as deductive logic. 
Though Jaynes played a leading role in initiating the “Bayesian” revival in statistics and beyond, 
and refers to his theory throughout as Bayesian, very little was actually contributed by Thomas Bayes 
himself. The terms “Bayes” and “Bayesian” are little more than custom without content; replacing 
them with “Jaynes” and “Jaynesian” would be both more accurate and more useful. It was Laplace 
whose  writings  pre-figured  more  of  the  conception  for  which  Jaynes  argued  so  passionately  and 
extensively. Jaynes goes well beyond both. He formally derived the whole framework from a few 
elementary logical desiderata, the most fundamental being the requirement of consistency. He showed 
how probability theory applies to non-equilibrium states. He showed how thermodynamic entropy and 
information-theory entropy (uncertainty) can be interpreted as the same concept, and not merely as 
sharing a mathematical expression. He emphasised the importance of distinguishing epistemic from 
frequentist definitions, which Bayes did not. He showed how classical statistical methods and frequentist 
probability  definitions  are  essentially  special  cases  of  his  methods  and  definitions.  He  established 
Maximum Entropy methods as the best way to set priors for things unknown. These methods are now 
used for data analysis and prediction in a wide range of applications. For all of these contributions he 
deserves widespread acknowledgement and attention. 
5. Relations Between Jaynes’s Probability Theory and Adaptively Self-Organized Complexity 
Jaynes presents his probability theory as the logic of science [1]. Here it is considered as the logic 
of life. There is a deep ambiguity within Jaynes’s theory. It is primarily concerned with the logic by 
which  scientists  should  make  explicit  inferences.  The  logic  proposed  is  so  general  and  unified, 
however,  that,  if  correct,  it  underlies  all  valid  inference,  whether  made  explicitly  by  scientists  or 
implicitly by anything. If living organisms adapt to their environment by implicitly making inferences Information 2012, 3  7 
 
 
about it, then it is possible that probability theory could provide a conceptual framework within which 
to  understand  how  they  do  so.  I  assume  that  any  such  contribution  would  be  at  the  level  of 
computational theory. i.e., it would clarify the logic underlying all inference, while leaving open issues 
concerning  the  particular  strategies  (representations  and  algorithms)  and  physical  mechanisms  by 
which requirements of that logic are met or approximated. 
Jaynes [27] related his theory to biology by discussing potential uses of his probability theory to 
infer organisms’ macroscopic properties from knowledge of their molecular structure. He suggested 
that this might be possible in some simple cases within a few decades. The issue here is not with what 
inferences science can draw about biological systems, however, but with principles of inference implicit 
in biological activity. We must therefore take a “first-person” view of information and inference from the 
perspective of the system itself [24,25]. This requires us to make inferences about inferential systems. 
Jaynes himself was very  inconsistent on this issue. His logic is often presented as prescriptive, 
showing how inferences should be drawn, and as requiring a scientist, or someone else, to specify the 
issues to be studied, to propose hypotheses, to provide the priors, and select the relevant data. He 
sometimes  explicitly  denied  that  the  theory  was  descriptive  of  the  way  in  which  people  or  other 
organisms do in fact infer. In 1958 he submitted a paper to a physics journal using the title “How does 
the brain do plausible reasoning?” In response to its rejection he said that the theory presented was not 
meant seriously as a description of how real brains actually do perform plausible reasoning, but as 
showing how an idealized “robot” brain should reason. Elsewhere, he argued that familiar problems of 
everyday life are typically so much more complicated than scientific problems, and depend on so many 
unknown and uncontrolled factors, that a full Bayesian analysis is out of the question in practice [1]. In 
replying to criticisms of the utility of Bayesian methods, he says “The first critic objected to Bayesian 
methods on the grounds that they do not tell us how to create hypotheses (although neither do any 
other methods). This is like criticizing a computer because it will not push its own buttons; of course, it 
is  up  to  us  to  tell  Bayesian  theory  which  problem  we  want  it  to  solve.  Would  anybody  want  it 
otherwise?” [26]. 
In contrast to such denials of probability theory as descriptive of implicit inference in biological 
systems, Jaynes more often argues for its applicability to inference of any kind. He showed in detail 
how  his  probability  theory  can  be  applied  to  irreversible  non-equilibrium  processes  as  well  as  to 
equilibrium processes [29], and that suggests potential relevance to self-organized complexity. His 
belief in the wider underlying generality of his proposed inferential principles is also made clear in his 
first paper on information theory and statistical mechanics [28], where he concludes that Shannon 
entropy, used as a measure of uncertainty, becomes the primitive concept with which we work, more 
fundamental even than energy. He later concluded that “seeing is inference from incomplete information”, 
and that probability theory is “telling us something about the way our own minds operate” when we 
unconsciously form intuitive judgments [1]. He explicitly argued that any reasoning which conflicts 
with Bayesian principles would place a creature at a decided survival disadvantage, so evolution by 
natural selection would automatically produce brains which reason in the Bayesian format. In reply to 
the claim that human reasoning is often not Bayesian, Jaynes says: “One disadvantage of having a little 
intelligence is that one can invent myths out of his own imagination, and come to believe them. Wild 
animals, lacking imagination, almost never do disastrously stupid things out of false perceptions of the 
world about them. But humans create artificial disasters for themselves when their ideology makes Information 2012, 3  8 
 
 
them unable to perceive where their own self-interest lies.” [26]. This implies that Bayesian inference 
is common across species, but in humans operates under special limitations that are a consequence of 
their own creative imagination. He also suggests that conscious human reasoning is sometimes misled 
by “false indoctrination”. 
Science has done for humans what nothing has done for any other species. Therefore, principles of 
Jaynes’s probability theory that distil the essence of inference in general cannot also distil any special 
essence unique to science. My working assumption is that science depends upon distinctively human 
cognitive capabilities that have somehow overcome constraints under which more widely embodied 
strategies, or algorithms, for inference operate. Probability theory, construed as the logic of science, 
requires explicit conscious hypothesis creation and testing by people such as scientists and engineers. 
In  life  more  generally  it  must  be  self-organized,  but  how  is  that  possible?  In  response  to  that 
fundamental mystery the following section reconsiders Coherent Infomax in the light of Jaynes’s logic. 
6. Relations Between Jaynes’s Probability Theory and Coherent Infomax 
Coherent  Infomax  was  originally  proposed  as  a  multi-purpose  algorithm  implemented  in 
mammalian neocortex [13]. In short, its task was to discover predictive relationships latent within rich 
datasets. Encouraged by the much greater generality of Jaynes’s probability theory, and by the broad 
conception of biological inference in Friston’s “free energy” theory [10,30], our working hypothesis is 
now that the relevance of Coherent Infomax extends well beyond neocortex. This broader potential is 
clearly implied by its formulation in terms of Shannon entropy. So, can it be combined with Jaynes’s 
unified theory of probability as extended logic to provide a unified conception of brain function? 
6.1. Challenges Faced by Theories of Self-Organized Inference in Neural Systems 
Creation of such a unified theory faces difficult challenges, however. First, it must be shown how 
inference can be self-organized. Second, though the logical desiderata from which Jaynes begins seem 
simple, they are councils of unattainable perfection at the system level. We cannot guarantee that all 
our beliefs are consistent, and we can rarely be sure that we use all relevant knowledge. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that some inconsistencies should be tolerated, or even welcomed. Therefore, it may be 
better to treat Jaynes’s  desiderata at the system level  as  goals to be approximated, rather than  as 
absolute requirements. Third, there is the difficulty well-known as the “curse-of-dimensionality” [31]. 
Most raw sensory data occurs within a space of such high dimensionality that individual events are 
distributed very sparsely throughout it, with most locations within the space being empty, and few with 
more than one prior sample. This is true for all realistic lifetimes, whether of individual or species, 
because  the  number  of  locations  grows  exponentially  with  dimensionality.  Therefore,  prior  events 
within the raw sensory space taken as a whole cannot serve directly as a basis for inference. As there 
are  enduring  regularities  within  the  real  world,  however,  most  events  actually  occur  on  or  near 
manifolds of much lower dimension. Discovery of such manifolds is therefore a crucial problem to be 
solved. Fourth, inferential tractability decreases exponentially with the number of constraints to be 
consistently satisfied. How can that difficulty be alleviated? Fifth, another major difficulty arises from 
the ubiquity of ambiguity. This is best resolved by using predictions arising from the context, but how Information 2012, 3  9 
 
 
can  that  be  done  while  avoiding  self-fulfilling  prophecies?  Finally,  any  major  transitions  through 
which inferential capabilities have evolved need to be identified. 
The following discussion outlines ways in which Coherent Infomax responds to these challenges, 
emphasizing the distinction between driving and contextual interactions. It then examines ways in 
which this distinction may be related to Jaynes’s probability theory. Limitations in the extent to which 
Coherent  Infomax  explains  higher  cognitive  functions  will  then  be  mentioned,  together  with  a 
discussion of the need for a more differentiated account of major transitions in cognitive evolution. 
6.2. How Coherent Infomax Responds to These Challenges 
The  Infomax  component  of  Coherent  Infomax  formalizes  a  widely  accepted  principle  for  the  
self-organisation  of  efficient  coding  in  neural  systems.  It  was  originally  called  the  “reduction  of 
redundancy” by Horace Barlow [32], then formalised and called Infomax by Ralph Linsker [33]. It 
maximizes the mutual information between input and output of a local processor under the constraint 
of substantial data compression, so it greatly eases the curse-of-dimensionality. Infomax is formulated 
using Shannon entropy, and increases information transmission by maximizing the variance of outputs 
given the actual inputs received. It can therefore be directly related to Maximum Entropy methods in 
the case of Gaussian noise [33]. 
Useful inference requires more than efficient coding, however. Sensory systems can provide so 
much information that the more difficult problem is separating the crucial variables from the “noise”. 
When there is far too much information for any given purpose, more is required than compression of 
all  the  available  information  into  a  smaller  amount  of  data.  Coherent  Infomax  suggests  a  way  of 
specifying what information to transmit; its objective is to discover and amplify those variables that are 
predictively  related  to  the  particular  context  in  which  they  occur.  It  therefore  provides  a  way  of 
specifying what information is important. Elementary variables discovered to be crucial to survival by 
adaptive evolution can then be specified directly rather than having to be discovered through further 
learning. Coherent Infomax can then discover and amplify new variables defined upon richer data-sets 
that predict the crucial variables. Once evolved because of their contribution to survival, however, 
mechanisms implementing Coherent Infomax can be used to discover and create statistical structure 
that  may  have  little  or  no  relevance  to  survival.  Similarly,  in  a  practical  application  of  Coherent 
Infomax,  the  engineer  could  directly  specify  any  relevant  variables  that  are  known,  and  then  use 
Coherent Infomax to find new variables that are predictively related to them. In addition, however, he 
could also use it for open, exploratory, data mining. 
An unavoidable consequence of the curse-of-dimensionality is that large amounts of data must  
be  divided  into  subsets  that  are  small  enough  to  make  learning  feasible.  If  they  were  processed 
independently, however, then relations between the subsets would be unobservable. Success in finding 
the relevant manifolds would then be completely dependent upon the original division into subsets, but 
that is unlikely to be adequate unless the manifolds were already known. Coherent Infomax responds 
to this dilemma by dividing data at each level of an interpretive hierarchy into many small subsets, and 
searching  for  variables  defined  on  them  that  are  predictively  related  across  subsets.  This  strategy 
allows for endlessly many ways in which the data can be divided into subsets, and linked across subsets. Information 2012, 3  10 
 
 
Grouping large datasets into smaller subsets can also make inference more tractable by limiting the 
number of constraints within which consistency is sought. Within many real situations, with large 
knowledge bases, the best that can be done is to maximise the local consistencies and minimize the 
local inconsistencies [34]. When performed dynamically within perception this is known as Gestalt 
grouping, and psychophysical studies have discovered many criteria on which it is based in biological 
perceptual systems. The importance and difficulty of these grouping processes is clearly demonstrated 
by  the  existence  of  a  whole  sub-discipline  within  machine  perception  devoted  to  the  task  of 
“perceptual organization”. The information required for such dynamic grouping overlaps greatly with 
that required for contextual disambiguation, and much evidence suggests that within neural systems 
there is overlap between the mechanisms involved; furthermore, those mechanisms can be interpreted 
as implementing Coherent Infomax [14]. 
Contextual  disambiguation  is  central  to  the  Coherent  Infomax  strategy.  Because  the  data  to  be 
interpreted by local processors within each level of the hierarchy arises only from a subset of the data, 
it will typically be compatible with a range of possible interpretations. Coherent choices across the 
system as a whole can be facilitated by amplifying those local choices that are most likely within the 
context of the activity of other processors. These contextual predictions must not by themselves be 
sufficient to drive local processor activity, however, because, if they were, self-fulfilling prophecy 
would remove the ability to learn about the real world. This is formalized within Coherent Infomax as 
the minimization of the conditional mutual information between outputs and contextual inputs given 
the driving inputs. Information specifically about the context is therefore not transmitted, thus ensuring 
that it does not corrupt the information transmitted specifically about the driving inputs. In neural systems 
this is implemented by using the contextual inputs to control the gain of the response to the driving 
inputs, and several synaptic and local circuit mechanisms for doing this have been discovered [13–15,35]. 
6.3. Can the Asymmetry Between the Effects of Contextual and Driving Inputs Be Related to Jaynes’s 
Probability Theory? 
The  theory  of  Coherent  Infomax  is  based  on  a  fundamental  asymmetry  between  the  effects  of 
contextual  and  driving  inputs.  In  short,  contextual  inputs  are  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  to 
produce an output; driving inputs are both necessary and sufficient. Can this asymmetry be related to 
Jaynes’s probability theory? Prima facie, the most obvious possibility is that in Bayesian inference 
priors provide context-sensitivity. That is what I had long assumed, and it may seem obvious to many 
that context must operate via the prior. However, Jim Kay recently showed that not to be so [6]. In 
Coherent Infomax context contributes to the posterior via the likelihood, not via the prior. In Bayesian 
inference posteriors are proportional to the product of priors and likelihoods. There is no essential 
asymmetry between them. Strong priors can outweigh weak likelihoods, and vice versa. In its standard 
form, Bayesian inference is simply a way of accumulating data, and the distinction between earlier and 
later data is essentially arbitrary [1]. Priors are neither necessarily nor usually context-sensitive. What 
Jim Kay’s new perspective shows is that, in our approach, driving inputs are used to compute prior 
probability distributions, and that context contributes to the computation of the likelihood of the data to 
be  interpreted  given  the  “hypothesis”  whose  probability  is  to  be  updated  [6].  This  is  therefore Information 2012, 3  11 
 
 
equivalent to using context as part of the generative model in context-sensitive Bayesian techniques as 
mentioned below. 
Bayesian inference does seem to imply an asymmetry in that the data is a “given” that is assumed to 
be true. Data is also “fixed” in the sense that probability distributions are computed for likelihoods 
over varied model parameters for the given data. This asymmetry is less relevant here than at first 
appears, however, because the hypotheses whose probabilities are estimated by Bayesian inference 
concern unknown things. The objects of inference are not the observations themselves, but uncertain 
things about which the data provides evidence, such as the parameters in a model of the underlying 
processes that generate the data, or future data yet to be observed. Priors can provide evidence about 
those parameters that is as strong as, or stronger than, the current data. Consider a gambler who uses 
some system or inside knowledge to bet on a horse that loses. He may nevertheless be justified in 
making further bets on the same grounds if that strategy pays off over many races. No single outcome 
has a privileged status in determining that.  
An asymmetry equivalent to that emphasized by Coherent Infomax does occur in some uses of 
maximum entropy and Bayesian methods, however. In machine learning, for example, a probability 
distribution of possible translations of a new occurrence of a familiar word in a body of text may be 
estimated from a sample of prior translations. Conditional maximum entropy methods do this using 
context [36]. The item to be translated must have previously occurred at least once previously, and 
preferably  many  times,  so  it  should  be  defined  on  a  space  of  low  dimensionality.  The  particular 
combination of item and context may be entirely novel, however; so it can occur within a space of 
much higher dimensionality. Presence of the item to be translated is both necessary and sufficient to 
produce an output distribution; the context is neither necessary nor sufficient. This is equivalent to the 
effects of context in Coherent Infomax. Context-sensitivity has also been added to Bayesian techniques 
in some other applications. In bioinformatic data mining, for example, context-sensitivity was found to 
make dramatic improvements in both the precision and the sensitivity of predictions [37]. Context-sensitive 
Bayesian techniques have also been applied to the task of correcting spelling errors that result in valid 
words, but where the context indicates that some other word was intended [38]. The role of context in 
all these applications is essentially equivalent to that in Coherent Infomax, so their practical success 
greatly encourages our study of its theoretical significance. 
6.4. What Are the Major Transitions in the Evolution of Inferential Capabilities? 
When showing how learning can proceed without necessitating storage of all the details of past 
experience, Jaynes [1] distinguished between conscious and subconscious inference. He suggests that 
subconscious processes continually update a density function for each probability to be estimated. This 
function has a broad distribution when the prior evidence is weak. It has a single high peak when prior 
evidence for the stored probability is strong. The former, but not the latter, is easily changed by new 
evidence. He suggests that in humans the subconscious system (which is similar to what psychologists 
call “procedural memory”) may more reliably reflect the inferential principles that he proposes than 
does the conscious system. In contrast to that suggestion, advances in the cognitive and neurosciences 
support the view that Bayesian principles play a leading role in both conscious human reasoning [39], 
and unconscious inference [11,40]. Though that work still has far to go [41], and has so far made little Information 2012, 3  12 
 
 
use of Jaynes’s advances on Bayes, it shows that, as he thought, his preliminary explorations of these 
issues, were early steps into a large new territory.  
A crucial issue within that territory concerns the possibility of major transitions in the evolution of 
inferential capabilities. Szmatháry and Maynard Smith [42] identified seven major transitions in the 
evolution  of  life,  such  as  the  transition  from  asexual  to  sexual  reproduction.  Only  one  of  those 
concerned cognition, i.e., the transition to language. Major transitions in the evolution of inferential 
capabilities prior to language are also possible, however, and it is crucial to determine whether this is 
so because empirical studies of inferential capabilities will be misinterpreted if they are assumed to 
reflect a single strategy, when instead they reflect a mixture of strategies, either across or within species.  
Probability theory could contribute to this issue by proposing various possible inferential strategies. 
For example, these could range from those with requirements that are simple to meet but with severely 
limited  capacities,  through  intermediate  stages  of  development,  to  those  having  more  demanding 
requirements but with enhanced capabilities. Some possible transitions are as follows: from predictions 
only  of  things  that  are  directly  observable  to  estimates  of  things  not  directly  observable;  from 
generative models averaged over various contexts to those that are context specific; from hypotheses 
determined by input data to those that are somehow more internally  generated; from probabilistic 
inference to syntactic structure, and, finally, from hypothesis testing to pure hypothesizing freed from 
testing. Within stages marked by such transitions there would still be much to be done by gradual 
evolutionary processes. For example, context-sensitive computations can make astronomical demands 
on computational resources, so they are only useful if appropriate constraints are placed on the sources 
and size of contextual input, as already shown for its use in natural language processing [38]. Thus, 
even given the ability to use contextual information, the search for useful sources of contextual input 
could still be a lengthy process, even on an evolutionary timescale, and produce much diversity. 
Transition  from  non-conscious  to  conscious  strategies  was  not  included  in  the  list  of  possible 
transitions  just  given  for  the  simple  reason  that  all  of  those  mentioned  were  explicitly  related  to 
probabilistic  inference.  It  is  not  clear  how  that  can  be  done  for  consciousness.  Though  it  is  not 
necessary for inference, the possibility that various aspects of consciousness are associated with one or 
more of the possible transitions listed may be an important issue for further research. 
These speculations go far beyond the current theory of Coherent Infomax. Limitations of the theory 
are discussed elsewhere [43], but one of particular relevance here is that the theory does not even account 
for intentional representation [13]. It neither assumes nor explains the existence of an interpreter who 
knows of, and distinguishes, both signs and what they signal. Our hope is that the theory will contribute 
to our understanding of such higher cognitive functions by showing what can be done without them, thus 
revealing both the foundations on which they build, and the constraints they overcome. 
The tension between creation and discovery implicit in Jaynes’s view of the human imagination is 
memorably expressed in the quote from Montaigne with which he begins his 1990 paper [26]: “Man is 
surely mad. He cannot make a worm; yet he makes Gods by the dozen.” Man’s ability to make a worm 
is now closer to reality than Montaigne thought, and, creativity underlies life in general; not only does 
it  form  and  reform  itself,  but  it  also  transforms  the  world  in  which  it lives.  Our  susceptibility  to 
delusion may therefore be a price we pay for the capabilities that enable us to create organized worlds 
of ever-increasing complexity [15,44], though that hypothesis needs careful formulation [45]. Information 2012, 3  13 
 
 
7. Does Self-Organized Inference in Living Things Have an Objective? 
Several  theories  of  brain  function  derive  system  properties  from  a  formally  specified  objective 
function whose value tends to change in one direction over time as the system evolves, in both the 
short-term  and  the  long-term.  Coherent  Infomax  is  one  of  them.  Though  Jaynes  proposed  an 
underlying logic for plausible inference, he did not specify inferential objectives, which were assumed 
to be supplied by the scientist, engineer, or whoever else is making the inferences. Coherent Infomax 
adds to Jaynes’s logic by proposing a formal objective function, and by showing, in principle, how that 
objective  can  drive  the  dynamics  of  adaptively  self-organized  complex  systems.  This  objective  is 
Jaynesian in spirit, however, because it produces patterns of activity in which the mutual information 
shared by elements is high, even though it also increases their joint information. This is “Jaynesian” 
because it increases the amount of information from which useful inferences can be drawn. 
The  theory  of  Coherent  Infomax  was  developed  independently  of  any  particular  definition  of 
probability, but Fiorillo [46] argues strongly that the use of a unified Jaynesian definition would enable 
neuroscience  advance  beyond  the  state  currently  reached  by  using  Bayesian  theories  without 
acknowledging any distinction between frequentist and epistemic probabilities. From that perspective, 
he argues that the computational goal of neural systems is to infer or predict states of the world for the 
purpose of deciding which motor outputs to select. Quantitatively he describes this as minimizing 
uncertainty about biologically relevant aspects of the world, or, equivalently, as maximizing information 
about  those  aspects  [46].  This  goal  is  similar  to  that  of  Coherent  Infomax,  and  in  both  Fiorillo’s  
theory [24,46] and ours inference is seen as central to brain function, and Jaynes’s ideas are seen as 
providing  an  insight  into  its  underlying  logic  that  is  far  more  profound  than  the  mere  Bayesian 
inversion of conditional probabilities. 
If it is not only entropy, but also self-organized complexity that increases over much of cosmic 
history, then Richard Dawkins’ selfishness is not the only option for a scientifically based conception 
of long-term objectives. We can think of life at the ecological and species levels, not as “evolved to 
reproduce”, but as “reproducing to evolve”; i.e., in the direction of the formally specified objective. 
One  answer  to  the  question  “Why  does  it  do  that?”  is  then  simply  “Because  it  can”.  From  that 
perspective we can think of our own individual efforts as directed, not merely towards survival, but as 
directed towards whatever organized complexities we choose to create. 
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